I wonder if an analogy might help?  I have recently read Mark Lilla's
two-part review of the Heidegger/Arendt correspondence in the last two
issues of the New York Review of Books, and I found myself thinking
about the similarities between the Heidegger case and the Pound case.
In many ways, Heidegger was far more culpable than Pound. He worked
actively to get Jewish colleagues and students dismissed from
university positions, while Pound, even as he became more and more
anti-Semitic in the late 1930s, continued to support the poetry of
Zukofsky and Oppen. Heidegger assumed the rectorship of a major German
university with the express purpose of infusing Nazi principles into
that institution; whatever Pound did affected only himself.  And
Heidegger systematically lied about the nature and extent of his
commitment to Hitler and to National Socialism, so that the full extent
of that engagement did not fully emerge until the 1980s.  Pound, in
contrast, mostly told the truth.
 
So Heidegger is a deeply tainted figure.  And yet you can't really do
philosophy today unless you come to terms with Heidegger.  That's as
true for people who stand at the opposite pole from him politically
(Sartre, for example, or, less dramatically, Richard Rorty) as for
people who share his blood and soil romanticism. And it seem
increasingly clear that both the people who wanted to save Heidegger
the philosopher by ignoring his politics and the people who used the
politics to trash the philosophy were wrong.  The philosophy is
integrally bound up with the Naziism; _Being and Time_, as Lilla
argues, leads us straight to Hitler and to National Socialism, which
represent, in effect, the political application of the philosophy
unfolded in that book. Does this fact discredit the philosophy? Or does
the error rather lie in the attempt to translate the philosophy into
political action? Is Plato's rationalism any more likely to lead to a
just state than Heidegger's existential phenomenology?
 
Perhaps I don't need to spell out the analogies.  The New Critics tried
to excise Pound's politics, leaving us with the pure poetry.  But in so
doing they cut out the heart of the poetry.  Casillo, who can't think
about anything except the politics,  dismisses Pound as a slave of his
own demonic prejudices--a fool at best, a monster at worst; and in the
process the poetry disappears. In contrast, I think that the
poets--Zukofsky, Olson, Duncan, Bunting, Creeley, and dozens of
others-- got it about right: that the politics are part of the whole
package, so you can't ignore them; that if you try to translate the
ideogrammic method into political action, the results are likely to be
fascism; that, nevertheless, as Bunting said, you've got a mountain
here, and you've got to come to terms with it; that whatever poetry can
be in our time must pass through Pound, just as whatever philoosophy
can be must pass through Heidegger